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W hile Houston was preoccupied with the oil
bust and recovery in the 1980s, immigration from
other countries profoundly changed the city. Legal
and illegal immigration, refugees and asylees, and
an amnesty program under the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) brought Houston
great opportunities and new challenges.
Immigration’s effects fall primarily on urban
areas, and eight cities—including Houston—are
home to more than half the immigrants that came to
the United States in the 1980s. Immigration policy
has again become controversial, as exemplified by
the passage of Proposition 187 in California. How-
ever, current interest in immigration reaches far
beyond any one state, as evidenced by a first-ever
presidential report on the subject, the report of the
Congressional Commission on Immigration Reform
and Texas’ suit against the federal government that
demands compensation for the government’s fail-
ure to halt illegal immigration. This article discusses
a complex issue that is important to Houston.
IMMIGRATION POLICY AND HOUSTON
We have no systematic assessment of
immigration’s benefits and costs to Houston or its
institutions, although we can infer its influence
indirectly from a variety of data. The last census
showed 290,000 people, or 17.8 percent of Houston’s
population, to be foreign-born. Among these immi-
grants, 168,500—some 58 percent—came to Hous-
ton between 1980 and 1990. The city’s total population
growth in the 1980s was diverse but dominated by
Hispanics. With 2-percent overall growth, Anglos
fell in number by 20 percent, African–Americansgrew 4 percent, Asians grew 12 percent and
Hispanics 60 percent. Of the 378,000 Texas
amnesty applications under IRCA, Houston pro-
vided 35.4 percent. Metropolitan Houston is
now home to the largest Hispanic population in
Texas and the sixth largest in the United States.
There is no single explanation for these
trends. Immigration policy is strictly a federal
responsibility, and U.S. immigration law encom-
passes three distinct areas: legal immigration is
primarily to enter the United States for family
reunification or to provide specific job skills that
are scarce domestically; humanitarian admis-
sions are for refugees and asylees; and illegal
immigration consists of about one-half illegal
entrants and one-half legal entrants who over-
stay their visas. In 1986, the Immigration Reform
and Control Act created a large new group of
previously illegal but amnestied immigrants.
Each of these laws and policies deeply affected
Houston in the 1980s.
An immigrant is any person who comes to
the United States with the intent to stay perma-
nently. Over the past 30 years, U.S. immigration
policy has changed dramatically. Before 1965, a
national-origin quota system determined who
entered the United States legally. Under this
system, two-thirds of the immigrants came from
Europe or Canada, another 25 percent from
other Western Hemisphere countries and only 6
percent from Asia. The 1965 amendments to the
Immigration and Nationality Act created new
national-origin quotas, resulting in a swing in the
composition of legal immigration away from
Europe and Canada (13 percent in the 1980s)
and toward other Western Hemisphere coun-
tries (47 percent) and Asia (37 percent). The 1965
act not only changed quotas but greatly in-
creased them, doubling the legal admissions to
the United States from 300,000 per year in the
1960s to 675,000 in the 1990s.
Prior to 1986, it was illegal to be an undocu-
mented alien in the United States but not to hire
one. The IRCA changed this, imposing stringent
employer sanctions and simultaneously offering
amnesty to 3 million illegal workers. However,
our unwillingness or inability to control illegal
immigration still results in 200,000 or more net
additions to the U.S. population each year.
Further, humanitarian admissions to the United
States doubled between 1985 and 1990. The total
effect was that 9.5 million immigrants entered
the country in the 1980s, nearly 1 million more
than at the peak of the last great wave of
immigration at the beginning of the century.
More than half of the U.S. population increase in
the 1980s is attributable to immigrants.
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF IMMIGRATION
A decade ago, the conventional wisdom told
us that immigration was an economic windfall
for the United States. The typical immigrants of
the 1960s, for example, arrived in the United
States at a disadvantage in terms of culture and
language, but after a decade they out-earned the
native population. However, the broadly inclu-
sive immigration policies pursued by the United
States in recent years no longer clearly lead to
these results. Most recent immigrants entered
the United States with weaker skills than earlier
immigrants, and there is compelling evidence
these groups may never match the earnings
of native workers. However, as we appraise
recent immigrants, it remains important to dis-
tinguish legal, illegal, humanitarian and other
immigration.
According to the Urban Institute, immigrants
are concentrated at the extremes of the educa-
tional distribution. They are more likely than the
native population to have low educational at-
tainment but also more likely to hold advanced
degrees. Immigrants entering between 1980 and
1990 can be divided into three groups: those
from Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala; those
from 11 refugee countries such as Cuba, Vietnam
and Afghanistan; and those from all other coun-
tries. The first group of countries supplies more
than 50 percent of illegal immigration to the
United States, as well as 80 percent of those
legalized under IRCA. The educational differ-
ences among these groups are wide; 75 percent
of the immigrants from countries that supply
large numbers of illegal immigrants have less
than a high school diploma. Immigration domi-
nated by legal sources, however, has a strong
representation among the highly educated, much
better, in fact, than the native population.
Similar differences arise among these groups
in annual earnings. Recent immigrants, taken
together, may lag the earnings of the native
population in recent years, but it is unclear we
can make this case for legal immigrants, who
make up more than 60 percent of recent entrants.
Also, whatever their educational status, we col-
lectively agreed to accept IRCA immigrants as we
began controlling illegal immigration through
employer sanctions. Further, refugees and asyleesenter as part of a fundamental national commit-
ment to those fleeing persecution.
Historically, the debate over immigration has
focused on jobs. Difficult economic times bring
out anti-immigrant feelings, and it is no coinci-
dence that Proposition 187 succeeded when
California’s economy badly lags the nation’s. Do
immigrants take jobs from American workers?
Whatever the public perception, repeated stud-
ies of national and regional labor markets find a
weak negative relationship between the number
of immigrants to a region and a decline in job
opportunities and wages. No relationship is
apparent even in such dramatic cases as the
Muriel boatlift from Cuba, which brought mostly
unskilled workers who swelled Miami’s labor
force by 7 percent almost overnight. There is
some evidence, however, that recent immigrants
may have flooded a more narrowly defined
market for low-skilled and low-wage workers. In
the 1980s, high school dropouts saw a decline of
10 percentage points in real wages relative to
those with a high school diploma. Based on
reasonable estimates of wage response to immi-
gration, new entrants could be responsible for
half of this decline.
Jobs are the primary magnet for legal and
illegal immigration, but public attention has
recently focused on a perceived “benefits mag-
net” that draws immigrants to the United States.
Does the immigrant pay his or her way in the
welfare state? The only point of agreement
among studies that examined this issue is that
immigrants exact a high price in required social
services and education, perhaps $40 to $50
billion per year. Legal immigrants impose the
highest costs because they are the biggest group,
with social service demands typically made soon
after arrival as they adjust to a new culture.
Refugees impose costs through a number of
well-defined programs that help them settle in
the United States. Fewer benefits are available
for illegal immigrants, although they or their
U.S.-born children may qualify for public hous-
ing or aid for dependent children. Federal court
mandates that children of undocumented aliens
receive a free public education through grade 12
add substantially to the cost of undocumented
workers. Proposition 187, aimed at cutting off
health, welfare and educational services to ille-
gal workers, has been widely perceived as
uncompassionate and even posing local health
and other social risks. Further, the initiative aims
at the lesser of two magnets—jobs dominate
welfare as a lure to immigrants.
Immigrants also pay taxes and thus help pay
for social services, but studies sharply divide on
whether their taxes are enough to cover their
own costs. The studies use an accounting frame-
work that bogs down in many contradictory
assumptions and results. Again, however, legal
immigrants probably pay their way in the long
run, and for IRCA immigrants and refugees it is
beside the point, as the United States welcomed
them here for other reasons. This leaves only
illegals, the group with the least access to social
services, falling outside policy and law.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
The presence of 3.5 million illegal immi-
grants in the United States is evidence that
employer sanctions under IRCA have failed to
deter illegal immigration. Estimates of how well
employers comply with IRCA vary, but enforce-
ment under IRCA is complicated and invites the
use of fraudulent documents. As many as 29
different documents can now be used to estab-
lish work authorization, although the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service is working to
reduce that number. Widespread use of fraudu-
lent documents undermines IRCA’s requirement
that employers “knowingly” hire undocumented
workers before the INS can impose sanctions.
A system to control permission to work in
the United States has proved difficult to design.
It can’t impose heavy sanctions that frighten
employers into discriminating against recent
immigrants because they have a foreign appear-
ance or accent. For example, Strategy Research
Corp. estimates 34 percent of Houston’s His-
panic population is primarily Spanish-speaking
and only learning English. One proposal from
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform
involves a computerized registry, based on the
Social Security card of everyone authorized to
work in the United States. However, such a
system also raises privacy issues associated with
a central database.
Finally, we must consider our neighbor
Mexico. Mexico benefits from immigration as a
safety valve for unemployment and from the
repatriation of wages to relatives. Further, Mexico
feels our lack of border enforcement is an open
invitation to its citizens—an inducement—to
come to the United States and provide low-wage
labor. Mexico has deep concern about how we
treat these immigrants.For more information, call Bill Gilmer at (713) 652-1546.
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After a slow start, local retailers enjoyed
a good holiday season. Energy markets re-
mained largely unchanged in recent weeks,
except for very weak refining profits that stemmed
from last-minute changes in government man-
dates for reformulated gasoline. Overall, reports
indicate steady but moderate growth continued
in Houston through late 1994.
RETAIL AND AUTO SALES
New car and truck sales jumped 8 percent in
November compared with year-earlier figures,
but much of this improvement only offset sales
lost to flooding in October. Dealers reported
continued strong sales through December, which
is an important month in the auto business. Final
1994 figures for Houston-area auto sales will
probably show no growth over 1993 sales.
Retailers found November to be very slow
and difficult through the Thanksgiving holiday
season; unseasonably warm weather hurt the
sales of clothing and other seasonal items. Sales
turned around after Thanksgiving, and the typi-
cal retailer saw improvements of 5 percent or
more, compared with Christmas 1993. However,
extensive promotions and discounting may have
cut heavily into profit margins.
LUMBER AND PAPER
Lumber demand continues to be strong,
with growing commercial construction making
up for the decline in residential demand seen in
late 1994. Demand for all paper and cardboard
products continues to grow strongly, and prices
continue to rise. Newsprint prices, for example,
were up 20 percent in 1994.
ENERGY PRICES AND DRILLING ACTIVITY
Oil prices remained in the $17 to $18 range
in recent weeks, just as they did in September.
Natural gas prices, however, plunged to three-
year lows because of one of the century’s
warmest winters. Natural gas storage remained

































the domestic rig count weakened noticeably in
late 1994, respondents felt it was related more to
one-time factors than weak natural gas prices.
Oil field services and machinery companies
reported that good sales activity continued, with
firm prices for their products. Weakness in U.S.
drilling was offset by improved prospects over-
seas, especially in Latin America, and good levels
of activity in Canada and the Gulf of Mexico.
Respondents felt that natural gas drilling would
suffer this year, but that better oil prices (severely
depressed when drilling budgets were put to-
gether in 1994) would offset much of the gas-
related decline in 1995.
DOWNSTREAM ENERGY
Refiners experienced extremely poor mar-
gins in December, and some capacity has been
shut down until prices improve. Gasoline prices
plummeted on news of several counties pulling
out of the reformulated gasoline program, and
fuel oil sales were hurt by the warm winter. In
contrast to refining margins, retail marketing
margins were wide and very profitable. No
significant spot shortages were reported as the
reformulated gasoline program went into effect
in early 1995.
Petrochemicals remain in short supply, prices
continue to rise, and profits are very strong.
Demand is particularly strong from the auto and
industrial equipment sectors; most petrochemi-
cal customers find their suppliers are rationing
limited inventories.
REAL ESTATE
Industrial occupancy jumped sharply in the
fourth quarter, led by surging demand for ware-
house space. For the first time since 1991,
Houston managed to lease more office space
than was vacated during the year, but rents
remain flat. New and existing home sales are still
sluggish, as they have been since mid-1994, with
small entry-level homes remaining the dominant
factor in the single-family housing market.